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THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW

Miscellaneous
PRODUCTS LIABILITY - RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS - SECTION
402A - A MANUFACTURER Is LIABLE UNDER SECTION 402A FOR AN
INJURY CAUSED BY A DEFECTIVE PRODUCT WHEN ALTERATIONS MADE
BY THE BUYER WERE FORESEEABLE BY THE MANUFACTURER.

Capasso v. Minster Machine Co. (1976)
Plaintiff, an employee of Westinghouse Electric Company (Westinghouse), was injured while operating a power press machine purchased by
Westinghouse from the defendant-manufacturer. 1 The machine was originally equipped with a two-button control system which required an operator
to use both hands while operating.2 However, the manufacturer also
provided an optional foot switch that could be used instead of the two-button
system. Westinghouse ordered the optional switch and, after delivery of the
machine, installed it in place of the button device. 4 Plaintiff was injured
when the machine was accidentally activated by the footswitch while her
hand was within the area of operation.5 Plaintiff instituted suit against the
defendant-manufacturer in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania alleging negligence and strict liability in tort under
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (Restatement).6 On appeal
from an order granting the manufacturer's motion for a directed verdict, the
Third Circuit 7 reversed, holding that because the alteration of the machine
was within the contemplation of the manufacturer, the purchaser's
substitution of the optional foot switch did not constitute such a "substantial change" so as to preclude strict liability for a defective product under
section 402A. Capasso v. Minster Machine Co., 532 F.2d 952 (3d Cir. 1976).
While section 402A imposes liability only where the defective product
reaches "the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition
in which it is sold,"' 8 the drafters of that section expressed no opinion as to

1. Capasso v. Minster Machine Co., 532 F.2d 952, 953 (3d Cir. 1976). The

machine was used to trim excess rubber from molded rubber parts. Id.
2. Id. Because its use ensured that both of the operator's hands were shielded
from the area of trimming, the two-button control system was the principal safety
feature of the press. Id.

3. Id. Unlike the two-button control system, use of the footswitch did not prevent
the operator from putting his hands within the area of operation of the press. Id.
4. Id. at 954. Westinghouse installed an adjustable guard to prevent entry of the
operator's hands into the area in which the trimming mechanism descended, but this
was only partially effective in blocking entry. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. Westinghouse was made a third party defendant. Id.
7. The case was heard by Chief Judge Seitz, and Judges Van Dusen and Weis.
Chief Judge Seitz wrote the opinion.
8. Section 402A provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous

to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
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whether strict liability applies where a seller expects a product to be altered. 9
In Capasso, however, the Third Circuit stated that the concept of substantial
change "was designed to protect the maker from liability for uses not
reasonably contemplated and for which he could not therefore take safety
measures."' Because the defendant in the instant case, having sold the
footswitch to the plaintiffs employer, had notice at the time of the sale of
the machine that the purchaser intended to use the optional switch,"' and
because the machine was expressly designed to be operated by either the
two-button switch or the footswitch, 12 the court found that the jury should
have been permitted to decide whether the machine was in fact defective and
13
the defendant liable under section 402A.
Pennsylvania state and federal cases have not been entirely consistent
in their approach to the "substantial change" doctrine. Some have
considered foreseeability;1 4 some have considered whether there has been a
change in the identity of the product;' 5 and others have considered both
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) (emphasis added). In general, while
numerous cases have been brought under section 402A, relatively little has been
written on the subject of substantial change. Southwire v. Beloit E. Corp., 370 F. Supp.
842, 856 (E.D. Pa. 1974). However, Pennsylvania has had a comparatively greater
number of cases in which substantial change has been discussed. See generally
Annot., 41 A.L.R.3d 1251 (1972).
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Caveat (2) at 348 (1965). The
drafters' comment to section 402A speaks in terms of shifted responsibility:
The question is essentially one of whether the responsibility for discovery and
prevention of the dangerous defect is shifted to the intermediate party who is to
make the changes. No doubt there will be some situations and some defects, as to
which the responsibility will be shifted, and others in which it will not.
Id. Comment p at 357. The manufacturer must also foresee some unusual uses and
certain alterations; if the dangers inherent in such uses or alterations are foreseeable,
the manufacturer will be liable unless he provides a warning of these dangers. Id.,
Comment h at 351-52; see note 19 infra.
10. 532 F.2d at 956.
11. Id. at 953.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 955. Under Pennsylvania law, the lack of proper safety devices can
constitute a defective design for which there may be recovery under section 402A.
Bartkewich v. Billinger, 432 Pa. 351, 354, 247 A.2d 603, 605 (1968); see Carpenter v.
Koehring Co., 391 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Ford v. Harnischfeger Corp., 365 F.
Supp. 602 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
14. In D'Antona v. Hampton Grinding Wheel Co., 225 Pa. Super. Ct. 120, 310 A.2d
307 (1973), the court stated that "[t]he test [with respect to substantial change] is
whether the manufacturer could have reasonably expected or foreseen such an
alteration." Id. at 125, 310 A.2d at 310; see Southwire Co. v. Beloit E. Corp., 370 F.
Supp. 842 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (substantial change discussed within the context of
proximate causation); La Gorga v. Kroger Co., 275 F. Supp. 373, 383 (W.D. Pa. 1967),
aff'd, 407 F.2d 671 (3d Cir. 1969) (foreseeability is a factor in section 402A).
15. In Speyer, Inc. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 403 F.2d 766 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 1015 (1968), noted in Comment, Recent Developments in Products Liability
Law in Pennsylvania, 14 VILL. L. REV. 747 (1969), a contractor who serviced gasoline
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factors.' 6 It is submitted, however, that the concept of changed identity is,
standing alone, too broad a defense to be consistent with the intent of
section 402A, since a manufacturer, theoretically, could escape liability on
the basis of any change made by a purchaser as long as it changed the
identity of the product. The better approach would appear to be that of
Capasso - if the alteration is not foreseeable, and the product was not
previously defective, then the manufacturer is relieved from liability under
7
section 402A.1
Thus, Capasso suggests that the element of foreseeability, normally
required in negligence liability, also serves a purpose in determining strict
liability under section 402A. 18 As in negligence liability, anticipated
intervening conduct in strict liability will not relieve the manufacturer of
responsibility for product failure due to a defective condition. 9
pumps for the plaintiff installed a heavy-duty steel hose which created greater
pressure than the original hose. 403 F.2d at 768. When the pump exploded, the
defendant, the manufacturer of the pump, was not held strictly liable because the
substitution of the new hose constituted a substantial change insofar as there was a
change "in the condition of the product." Id. at 772. Similarly, in Dorsey v. Yoder Co.,
331 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa. 1971), the court relied upon Comment p to section 402A,
which states that substantial change occurs when the product is so changed as not to
be in its original usable state. Id. at 764, citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A, Comment p at 357 (1965); cf., Willeford v. Mayrath, 711 111. App. 3d 357, 287
N.E.2d 502 (1972) (assembly by purchaser did not significantly alter the identity of the
product). See generally Comment, Substantial Change: Alteration of a Product-as a
Bar to a Manufacturer's Strict Liability, 80 DICK. L. Rav. 245 (1976); Annot., 41
A.L.R.3d 1251 (1972).
16. In Schreffler v. Birdsboro Corp., 490 F.2d 1148 (3d Cir. 1974), the court used
both theories, stating: "[A]fter the defendant relinquished control, the table was so
substantially modified that it was then feasible to use the equipment in a manner
different from that which would have been expected from observation of the original
design." Id. at 1153 (citation omitted). Later in the opinion, the court went on to
discuss superseding cause. Id. at 1153-54.
17. In a very similar case, Hanlon v. Cyril Bath Co., No. 75-1334 (3d Cir., Dec. 9,
1975), the plaintiff was injured while operating a press brake because of accidental
activation due to an electric footswitch substituted by the plaintiffs employer in place
of a mechanical treadle supplied by the manufacturer. Id. slip op. at 3-4. The court
found that the substitution of the "significantly different" footswitch was a
substantial change; therefore, the manufacturer was not strictly liable. Id. slip op. at
4. The court, apparently, never considered whether the installation of the electric
footswitch was foreseeable by the manufacturer.
The Capasso court summarily distinguished Hanlon in a footnote. The court
felt that the foreseeability of the change in Hanlon removed that case from the
substantial change doctrine in section 402A(1)(b), whereas in Hanlon it was found as
a matter of law that there was a substantial change which relieved the defendant of
liability. 532 F.2d at 955 n.1; cf. Southwire Co. v. Beloit E. Co., 370 F. Supp. 84 (E.D.
Pa. 1974) (a counterweight welded to a casting without the manufacturer's knowledge
was held to be a substantial change); D'Antona v. Hampton Grinding Wheel Co., 225
Pa. Super. Ct. 120, 310 A.2d 307 (1973) (the question is whether the defendant could
reasonably have foreseen that his grinding wheel would be removed and another

manufacturer's substituted).
18. See Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel(Strict Liability to Consumers), 50 MINN.
L. REv. 791, 826-27 (1969). Actually, foreseeability in strict liability in tort under

section 402A already plays a part in determining those who are reasonably to be
expected to use the product. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1)(b) (1965).

19. See note 9 and accompanying text supra. Some courts have imposed far-

reaching liability upon manufacturers by holding that even anticipated conduct
which could result in substantial though unforeseen changes in the product would not

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1977

3

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 3 [1977], Art. 12
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22

However, the Capasso court not only discussed foreseeability in the
.context of whether a substantial change contemplated by the manufacturer
would relieve him of liability under section 402A. The court also discussed
the bearing of the foreseeability of the change in the product on the issue of
proximate causation. 20 The court concluded that in the case at bar there was
no evidence in the record that would establish as a matter of law that
Westinghouse's change of the product constituted a superseding cause; the
case would thus be permitted to go to the jury on remand to determine
whether the original defect was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs
injury. 21 The court seemed to reach this conclusion by reasoning that since
the alteration of the product was foreseeable, it did not break the chain of
legal causation flowing from the defective machine and optional footswitch
to the resulting injuries. 22 While a number of courts have expressed the
opinion that this use of the negligence standard of causation, which relies
upon foreseeability, has equal application to strict liability, 23 others have
argued that it does not. The latter courts, contending that "foreseeability is
not a test of proximate cause[,] it is a test of negligence," 24 would hold a
402A defendant liable for all consequences flowing in natural sequence from
the defective product. If the product was unforeseeably and substantially
changed, or abnormally (i.e., unforeseeably) used, the defendant is not liable
and no consideration of proximate cause is necessary. 25 It is submitted that

relieve the manufacturer of liability. See, e.g., L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § 16A[4], at 247 (2d ed. 1976) (dealer's normal servicing of car after delivery
by manufacturer will not relieve the latter of 402A liability).

20. 532 F.2d at 955-56. Many cases have dealt with the related question of what
alterations are of sufficient magnitude to be called substantial. Even though an
alteration is unforeseeable by the manufacturer, he may still be strictly liable if the
alteration is insubstantial and could not have caused the accident. See generally
Annot., 41 A.L.R.3d 1251, 1253 (1972) (alteration must be substantial).
21. 532 F.2d at 955. Defendant claimed that Westinghouse's installation of the

foot pedal broke the chain of causation and constituted a supervening cause. Id. The
court reasoned that since the changes made in the machine, though substantial, were
foreseeable by the defendant, they could not as a matter of law be considered to be a
supervening cause. Id.
22. Id.
23. See Southwire v. Beloit E. Corp., 370 F. Supp. 842 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Kiusis v.

Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., 457 Pa. 321, 319 A.2d 914 (1974); Prosser, supra note
18, at 826-27.
The Kiusis court, in discussing the issue of post-delivery alterations as

substantial changes in the product, equated the substantial change defense arid the
idea of supervening cause. 319 A.2d at 922 n.15. Thus, a change which was foreseen
would not break the chain of causation, which only consisted of foreseeable risks. Id.
A foreseeable change would break the chain only if it were implemented negligently,
as the negligence would constitute a supervening (unforeseen) cause of the injuries.
Id., citing D'Antona v. Hampton Grinding Wheel Co., 225 Pa. Super. Ct. 120, 310 A.2d
307 (1973).
24. Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 94, 337 A.2d 893, 900 (1975),
discussed in 21 VILL. L. REV. 794 (1976).

25. In Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975), the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the use of negligence terms and concepts in
jury instructions in section 402A cases constituted reversible error. Id. at 94-96, 337
A.2d at 899-902. The court explained that a 402A plaintiffs case would be established
upon proof of defect, injury, and proximate cause. Id. Furthermore, proof of causation
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the latter approach is preferable, as it would be inconsistent with the policy
of strict liability under section 402A to require the plaintiff to prove that a
reasonable person would have foreseen the consequences of the defendant's
26

conduct.

It should be noted that Capasso is not an authoritative statenmnt of
Pennsylvania

law.27 Nonetheless,

because Pennsylvania

courts

have

generally been consumer-oriented in their interpretation of section 402A, 21
they will probably accept the Third Circuit's position on foreseeability of
alteration by the purchaser. Under Capasso,a manufacturer is deemed to be
strictly liable, despite an alteration of his product by the purchaser, if he
29
The
provided the means by which the product could be altered.
manufacturer is liable not only for defects in the original equipment
provided with his product, but also for defects in any optional components
with which he may have supplied the purchaser. 30 Thus, a manufacturer
cannot escape liability to a consumer or user under section 402A merely by
did not depend upon proof of what the reasonable seller would expect the purchaser to
know, or what the reasonable purchaser would know. Id. Using these tests to
determine proximate cause resulted in imposing a negligence-type duty of care on the
402A defendant, which constituted an unwarranted limit on the scope of strict
liability. Id.; see L. FRUMAN & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 19, § 16A[4][d], at 297; see
note 14 and accompanying text supra.
26. For a general discussion of the broad consumer protection policy envisaged by
section 402A, see Prosser, supra note 18. In Southwire Co. v. Beloit E. Corp., 370 F.

Supp. 842 (E.D. Pa. 1974), the court discussed the interrelationship of unforeseeable
substantial changes and the doctrine of superseding cause in light of the policy of
402A. The court opined that if section 402A was viewed as imposing a heavy burden
upon the manufacturer by holding him liable without proof of fault, then this burden
should be lessened by relieving him of liability even where the changes in the product
were not substantial enough to constitute a supervening cause. Id. at 857 n.21.
However, if the policy of broad liability under 402A was felt to be warranted, the
defendant should be relieved of liability only when the change of the product was
substantial enough to qualify as a supervening cause. Id.
27. Under the doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), a federal court
sitting in a diversity action must apply state substantive law, but that state's courts
are not bound by the federal court decisions. See generally C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1057 (1969).
28. See, e.g., McCown v. International Harvester Co., 463 Pa. 13, 342 A.2d 381
(1975) (expressly rejecting a consumer's contributory negligence as a defense to strict
liability); Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975),
discussed in 21 VILL. L. REV. 794 (1976) (a product need not be "unreasonably

dangerous" for liability to be imposed under section 402A); D'Antona v. Hampton
Grinding Wheel Co., 225 Pa. Super. Ct. 120, 310 A.2d 307 (1973) (if the manufacturer
could foresee alteration of the product, he would not be relieved from strict liability).
29. 532 F.2d 952. Under the related doctrine of abnormal use, a manufacturer will
not be liable for a use of his product that was not intended or was abnormal.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment h, at 351-52 (1965). However, if
the manufacturer could have foreseen a particular use, though abnormal for that
product, he will not be relieved of liability under section 402A if the product is
defective and an accident is caused by that defect. See Kiusis v. Baldwin-LimaHamilton Corp., 457 Pa. 321, 319 A.2d 914 (1974). See generally Dole & Hilton, Use of
a Product - When is it Abnormal?, 4 WILLAMETTE L.J. 350 (1967); Noel, Defective
Products:Abnormal Use, ContributoryNegligence and Assumption of Risk, 25
L. REV. 93, 95 (1972).

VAND.

30. An alternative theory of relief upon which the plaintiff in Capassocould have
relied is that expressed in a number of cases holding a manufacturer liable for
defective component parts. In Greco v. Bucciconi, 407 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1968), a
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shipping his product in component parts or by providing various options or
attachments with which the purchaser might later alter the product."
'Because such changes by the purchaser are foreseeable by the manufacturer,
they do not constitute "substantial change" within the meaning of section
402A.
Charles J. Heinzer IV
machine was shipped in various component parts to the purchaser, who then
assembled it. Id. at 89. The court held that the assembly was not a sufficient
alteration to preclude liability. Id. at 91; see Burbage v. Boiler Eng'r & Supply Co., 433
Pa. 319, 249 A.2d 563 (1969); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment q, at
358 (1965).
31. See Comment, supra note 15, at 752.
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